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I.  INTRODUCTION 
War should not force children to forfeit their education or risk exposure to 
sexual violence, forced labor, forced recruitment, injury, or death.1  
International law requires that civilians be spared the hazards of war.2  
Moreover, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Children’s 
Convention),3 the most widely ratified international human rights treaty, 
implicates the child’s right to education.4  However, a quarter of a century 
after the adoption of the Children’s Convention, the right to education 
“remains merely aspirational,” as one nongovernment organization has 
recognized.5  Armed forces continue to use schools and universities during 
armed conflict, disrupting education around the world and putting both 
teachers and students at substantial risk of harm.6  There is a clear conflict 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Bede Sheppard, Guest Post: Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use, 
OPINIO JURIS (Dec. 16, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/12/16/guest-post-protect 
ing-schools-universities-military-use/ (noting that these dangers arise when armed groups 
convert schools and universities into bases, barracks, firing positions, or places to cache 
weapons and ammunition). 
 2 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].  There are 196 states party to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and 173 states party to both the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 
Additional Protocol I.  See States Parties: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States. 
xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=470.  Syria ratified 
Additional Protocol I on November 14, 1983, without attaching any reservations or 
declarations relevant to the question under review. Id.  
 3 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Children’s Convention].  This treaty, which entered into force on September 2, 1990, has 196 
parties, including two nonmembers of the United Nations, the Holy See and the State of 
Palestine.  See U.N. Treaty Collection, Convention on the Rights of the Child, https://treaties. 
un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-11.en.pdf.  The only 
nonparty states are the United States and Somalia, both of which have signed the treaty but not 
deposited instruments of ratification, along with the United Nations’ newest member state, 
South Sudan.  Id.  Syria ratified the 1989 Children’s Convention on July 15, 1993, without 
attaching any reservations or declarations relevant to the question under review. Id.  
 4 Press Release, Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA), 25 Years 
after Landmark Treaty, Children’s Rights Still Violated with Impunity in Conflict (Nov. 20, 
2014), http:// protectingeducation.org/news/25-years-after-landmark-treaty-children%E2%80 
%99s-rights-still-violated-impunity-conflict. 
 5 Id. 
 6 GCPEA, COMMENTARY ON THE “GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTING SCHOOLS AND 
UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE DURING ARMED CONFLICT” 4–5 (2014) [hereinafter 
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between the vision of protecting access to education and the reality of what 
young people experience in countries impacted by the turmoil of war.7 
The need for explicit standards and norms to protect schools from use by 
military forces resulted in the release of the Guidelines for Protecting 
Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict (the 
Guidelines) in 2014.8  This document, which provides recommendations to 
avoid the use of schools during armed conflict, emerged as a potential 
solution.9  This Note will evaluate the potential effectiveness of the 
Guidelines in protecting schools and universities from military use during 
armed conflict.  Part II will demonstrate the inherent problems arising from 
the military use of schools during armed conflict as evidenced by its effect in 
Syria.  It will also discuss the creation of the Guidelines, the content of the 
Guidelines, and the Guidelines’ desired effect.  Part III will address the gap 
in preexisting written and enforceable law.  Part IV will analyze the 
effectiveness of the Guidelines by first comparing the advantages and 
disadvantages of hard law and soft law.  Second, it will evaluate the 
Guidelines against key criteria set out by the Global Coalition to Protect 
Education from Attack, the nongovernment organization that effectuated the 
Guidelines.  Lastly, this Note will recommend that states adopt the 
Guidelines, and suggest amendments and additions to the Guidelines, namely 
inclusion of a reparations structure and accountability mechanisms.  
                                                                                                                   
COMMENTARY ON THE GUIDELINES], available at http://www.protectingeducation.org/sites/def 
ault/files/documents/commentary_on_the_guidelines.pdf. 
 7 Id.  
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 7.  The Guidelines were released on December 16, 2014 in Geneva, Switzerland, and 
represent “the culmination of over two years of extensive consultations with governments, 
militaries, UN agencies, and civil society to develop guidance to keep armed parties out of 
schools and universities.”  New International Guidelines Address an Insidious Gap in Protecting 
Education during War, GCPEA (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.protectingeducation.org/news/ne 
w-international-guidelines-address-insidious-gap-protecting-education-during-war.  
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II.  PROBLEM AND PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE MILITARY USE OF SCHOOLS, 
ESPECIALLY IN SYRIA, AND THE GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTING SCHOOLS 
AND UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE DURING ARMED CONFLICT AS A 
POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
A. Military Use of Schools Has Been Extremely Grave during Syria’s Civil 
War 
1.  Overall Problem 
Some men came to our village.  I tried to escape, but they took 
me to jail.  Except it wasn’t a jail—it was my old school.  It’s 
ironic—they took me there to torture me, in the same place I 
used to go to school to learn. . . . They had taken over the 
school and made it into a torture center.10  
This quote, from a fifteen-year-old boy from Syria, a country plagued by 
civil war since 2011,11 exemplifies the problems arising from armed forces’ 
utilization of schools and universities during times of war.  This section will 
present statistics and examples that illustrate the staggering gravity of this 
exploitation of school property.  These ill effects make apparent the looming 
need for a quickly adoptable and effective solution.  
The toll experienced by children during armed conflict is multifold.12  As 
has been well publicized, children are being recruited and used by armed 
forces.13  In response to this conflict, Leila Zerrougui, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict 
joined with the U.N. International Children’s Emergency Fund, popularly 
known as UNICEF, to initiate “Children, Not Soldiers,” a global campaign 
seeking support to end the recruitment of children for armed conflict by 
                                                                                                                   
 10 GCPEA, PROTECT SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE 6 (2013), http:// 
www.protectingeducation.org/sites/default/files/documents/protect_schools_and_universities 
_from_military_use.pdf. 
 11 Anthony Shadid, Syria Escalates Crackdown as Tanks Go to Restive City, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 25, 2011, at A1. 
 12 Press Release, Security Council, Gains Made Protecting Children in Situations of Armed 
Conflict Overshadowed by New Global Crises, Special Representative Tells Security Council, 
U.N. Press Release SC/11552 (Sept. 8, 2014) [hereinafter U.N. S.C. Press Release]. 
 13 Children, Not Soldiers, U.N. Office of the Special Rep. of the Secretary-General for 
Children and Armed Conflict, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/children-not-soldiers/. 
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targeting eight states.14  But another detriment experienced by children as a 
result of armed conflict is less well known: it is the armed forces’ use of 
schools and universities, resulting in the injury and killing of children, as 
well as disrupting their education. 
Leading the campaign against such use has been the Global Coalition to 
Protect Education from Attack (the Coalition), a joint effort of eight leading 
nongovernment organizations such as the Council for At-Risk Academics, 
Human Rights Watch, UNICEF, and the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization.15  Bede Sheppard, the Deputy 
Children’s Rights Director at Human Rights Watch and chair of the 
Coalition’s group on protecting schools and universities from military use, 
explained in a mid-2014 statement that “[a]rmies and armed groups are 
turning places of learning into battlefields by using them for military 
purposes.”16  Between 2005 and 2013, schools and universities were utilized 
by national armed forces in over twenty-three countries across Africa, Asia, 
Europe, the Middle East.17  Included were countries such as Afghanistan, 
Burma/Myanmar, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, India, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Nepal, 
Occupied Palestinian Territory/Israel, Pakistan, Philippines, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen.18  After 
being overtaken by armed forces, schools and universities were used as 
bases, barracks, detention facilities, interrogation and torture centers, 
defensive or offensive positions, observation posts, military training 
facilities, and weapons and ammunition storage.19  Sheppard recalled that 
while researching the issue, he had seen: soldiers’ bunk-beds in teachers’ and 
principals’ rooms in India; roadblocks outside of a school occupied by army 
soldiers in Yemen’s capital; barbed wire surrounding a school in Thailand 
where paramilitary forces had taken over classrooms; and soldiers guarding a 
school’s entryway in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.20  
                                                                                                                   
 14 Id.  
 15 COMMENTARY ON THE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 2. 
 16 Norway: Leading Way to End Military Use of Schools, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 13, 
2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/13/norway-leading-way-end-military-use-schools. 
 17 GCPEA, LESSONS IN WAR IN 2015: MILITARY USE OF SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES DURING 
ARMED CONFLICT 32 (2015); PROTECT SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE, 
supra note 10, at 5. 
 18 PROTECT SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE, supra note 10, at 10–11. 
 19 Id. at 5.  
 20 Bede Sheppard, From Sagene to Sanaa, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 7, 2013), http:// 
www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/07/sagene-sanaa. 
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Military use of schools and universities has resulted in a decline of 
student attendance and enrollment and in the availability of teachers.21  
Further, the presence of armed forces in schools and universities leads to 
students dropping out, lower rates of transition into higher education, and 
overall poorer educational attainment.22  The ensuing damage and destruction 
caused to educational buildings has led to long-term school closures and the 
displacement of students into schools from home; this too reduces 
enrollment.23  In some cases, only part of the school is taken over, exposing 
students to sexual violence and forced labor.24  Most notably, military 
occupation of schools and universities has resulted in the injury and death of 
students and teachers alike.25  
2.  Syria 
During the armed conflict in Syria, for example, both government forces 
and opposing armed groups have used schools for military purposes.26  
According to the 2014 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and 
Armed Conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, the military use of schools and 
attacks on schools in Syria “severely disrupted children’s right to access to 
education.”27  Government forces and armed opposition groups alike have 
damaged or destroyed school buildings.28 
Schools in Syria have been used as barracks, operational bases, sniper 
postings, and detention facilities—all while classes were in session.29  Over 
twenty percent of Syria’s schools were transformed into shelters, depriving 
almost 2 million students of their right to an education.30  Government 
statistics estimated that, as of October 2013, 2.26 million children in Syria 
either were not attending school or were attending irregularly.31  Similarly, 
over 52,500 teachers and 523 school counselors in Syria did not attend 
                                                                                                                   
 21 Id.  
 22 COMMENTARY ON THE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 4. 
 23 PROTECT SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE, supra note 10, at 5. 
 24 Norway: Leading Way to End Military Use of Schools, supra note 16. 
 25 PROTECT SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE, supra note 10, at 5. 
 26 Syria: Attacks on Schools Endanger Students, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/05/syria-attacks-schools-endanger-students. 
 27 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed 
Conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. S/2014/31 (Jan. 27, 2014). 
 28 Id.  
 29 Id. ¶ 44. 
 30 Id. ¶ 46. 
 31 Id. ¶ 40. 
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work.32  More than 3,000 Syrian schools had been destroyed.33  Not only did 
such uses occupy space that was meant for students, and thus force students 
to conduct their learning elsewhere, these uses also converted schools and 
universities into military targets under the laws of war, making both teachers 
and students vulnerable to attack.34  
Schools fell under attack from all parties to the war, including 
government forces and armed opposition groups.35  Teachers and students 
who fled Syria described instances in which students had been interrogated 
and beaten by state security agents for allegedly engaging in anti-government 
activity.36  Security forces and pro-government militias also assaulted 
otherwise peaceful student demonstrations.37  Interrogations, arrests, and 
raids at schools resulted in children staying home from school out of fear.38  
Students also recalled instances when government snipers shot, injured, and 
killed children at school.39  
An elementary school student from Aleppo city was forced to take refuge 
after an April 2014 attack on his school.40  Ahrar Al Sham, an armed 
coalition participating in the Syrian war, had occupied his school since 
2012.41  On April 30, 2012, this young boy and his brother attended an art 
exhibition and singing event for children with their teacher at an elementary 
school in Al Ansari Al Sharqi.42  Approximately 400 people filled the school 
by 9 a.m., and hundreds more were expected to arrive.43  At about 9:05 a.m., 
however, the roar of a warplane preceded a force that thrust the boy back 
against the wall.44  When he regained consciousness, he saw that the 
schoolroom was destroyed, with shattered glass and large holes in the 
ceiling, and a fourth-grade female student sitting on a chair, either 
                                                                                                                   
 32 Id.  
 33 Id. ¶ 46. 
 34 COMMENTARY ON THE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 4. 
 35 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Syrian Arab 
Republic, supra note 27, ¶ 39. 
 36 Syria: Attacks on Schools Endanger Student, supra note 26. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Syrian Arab 
Republic, supra note 27, ¶ 41. 
 40 Human Rights Council, 27th Sess., Selected Testimonies from Victims of the Syrian 
Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/CPR.1, at 10 (Sept. 16, 2014). 
 41 Id.  
 42 Id. at 10–11. 
 43 Id. at 11. 
 44 Id. 
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unconscious or dead.45  The boy was bleeding from his head, among other 
injuries, but was quickly rescued by three men.  When he finally returned 
home, he learned that his younger brother had been killed in the incident.46 
The boy’s father heard a loud explosion and saw smoke coming from the 
elementary school.47  He rushed to the school, arriving within ten minutes.48  
He said that the school building was severely damaged and “pools of blood 
and dead bodies were scattered everywhere.”49  The father searched among 
the students trapped beneath rubble and the bodies and severed body parts 
for his children.  He finally located his youngest son at the nearby hospital 
with a serious head injury, but the child died while being transferred to 
Turkey for medical treatment.50 
The war in Syria has also disrupted higher education.  The damage the 
war has caused to universities has stripped students of the ability to attend 
classes in those buildings.51  Increasing dangers prompted students to stay 
home from school.52  It is likely that the education of hundreds of thousands 
of students has been disrupted, and that thousands more have been prevented 
from even beginning their pursuit of higher education.53 
“Syrian children have had to face things in the horrors of war that no 
child should have to bear—interrogated, targeted, and attacked,” stated 
Priyanka Motaparthy, a children’s rights researcher at Human Rights Watch, 
in a 2013 report.54  “Schools should be havens,” she continued, “but in a 
country that once valued schooling, many Syrian children aren’t even getting 
basic education and are losing out on their future.”55  
                                                                                                                   
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id.  
 49 Id.  
 50 Id. at 11–12. 
 51 KEITH WATENPAUGH, ADRIANNE FRICKE & JAMES KING, THE WAR FOLLOWS THEM 9 
(June 2014), available at http://www.protectingeducation.org/sites/default/files/documents/ 
the_war_follows_them_iie-uc_davis_study_on_syrians_in_lebanon_and_higher_education_ 
june_2014.pdf. 
 52 Id.  
 53 Id. at 9–10. 
 54 Syria: Attacks on Schools Endanger Students, supra note 26.  
 55 Id. 
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B.  Response to Military Use of Schools: The Guidelines 
1.  Development Leading to Adoption of the Guidelines 
In 2013, the Coalition released a report detailing how armed forces utilize 
schools and universities in armed conflict and the resulting consequences of 
this practice.56  One such consequence is students being deprived access to 
education and being put at risk when educational facilities become legitimate 
military targets under international law.57  
In May 2012, the Coalition organized an expert consultation that was 
hosted by the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights in Geneva, Switzerland.58  As a result of encouragement from 
the May 2012 consultation attendees,59 a larger group of experts from around 
the world met in November 2012 in Lucens, a village in the canton of Vaud 
in Switzerland, to discuss the development of guidelines to protect schools 
and universities from military use.60  Representatives from eleven states, 
along with nongovernment organizations and U.N. agencies, reviewed and 
provided significant feedback to the initial draft of the guidelines.61  This 
initial draft was prepared by Dr. Steven Haines, a former senior officer in the 
British Armed Forces, former chair of the editorial board of the United 
Kingdom’s Joint Service Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict, and a 
professor at the University of Greenwich.62  Dr. Haines then incorporated 
revisions, formed a drafting committee for their review, and held 
consultations for additional input.63  As a result of this process, in June 2013 
the Coalition released the Draft Lucens Guidelines for Protecting Schools 
and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict (Draft 
Guidelines).64 Subsequently, the Coalition sought support from states, 
multilateral institutions, and other organizations to finalize, and then adopt, 
endorse, and implement these guidelines.65  
                                                                                                                   
 56 PROTECT SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE, supra note 10, at 3. 
 57 Id. 
 58 COMMENTARY ON THE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 6. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id.  
 62 Id. 
 63 Id.  
 64 Id.  
 65 Id.  
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The Draft Guidelines were met with considerable support.  At a 
September 2014 Security Council meeting, Yoka Brandt, the Deputy 
Executor Director of UNICEF, encouraged all member states to support and 
implement the Draft Guidelines.66  Public statements in support of the Draft 
Guidelines were issued or endorsed by Algeria, Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Croatia, Chile, Cote d’Ivoire, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, European 
Parliament, Finland, France, Iceland Japan, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, 
Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Senegal, Slovenia, South Africa, South Sudan, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, as well as the Special Representative to the 
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the Security-General, 
the U.N. Special Envoy for Global Education, Gordon Brown, the Global 
Partnership for Education, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and 
UNICEF.67  According to the Coalition, this support indicates a “growing 
international interest in protecting schools and universities from military use 
during armed conflict.”68 
In support of their acceptance of the Draft Guidelines, Austria, Croatia, 
and Slovenia issued a joint statement in March 2014 declaring that they are 
“gravely concerned about the use of schools for any military purposes since 
it is detrimental to the children’s rights to education, jeopardizing their 
chances for the future.”69  They continued by expressing their desire to 
“underline the right and access to education as a fundamental human right,” 
and called the Draft Guidelines “a very concrete step forward” towards 
achieving protection for educational institutions during times of conflict.70  
Statements issued from each of the countries similarly expressed a deep 
concern for the state of access to education in times of conflict.71  The 
statements further contain expressions of welcome and commitment to the 
Draft Guidelines.72   
The finalized version of the Guidelines for Protecting Schools and 
Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict was publicly released 
                                                                                                                   
 66 U.N. S.C. Press Release, supra note 12. 
 67 Public Statements in Support of the Guidelines and Safe Schools Declaration, GCPEA, 
http://www.protectingeducation.org/support-process. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
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on December 16, 2014 at an event in Geneva, Switzerland.73  Fifty-four 
states have since endorsed and committed to implementing the Guidelines.74 
2.  Content of the Guidelines  
The Guidelines urge parties to armed conflict to refrain from using 
schools and universities in any way supporting their military efforts, even 
uses that would not be contrary to the law of armed conflict.75  It urges 
parties to avoid “impinging on students’ safety and education,” and instead 
use the Guidelines as a tool to avoid such situations.76  The Commentary on 
the Guidelines provides an introduction, and the document itself contains six 
actual guidelines.  The introduction and the Guidelines include the following: 
Introduction: The introduction to the Guidelines details the military use of 
schools and universities during armed conflict.77  It gives information on the 
right to education and the need to protect schools and children from the 
effects of armed conflict.78  The introduction further explains that the 
Guidelines were drafted “with the aim of reducing the use of schools and 
universities by parties to armed conflict in support of their military effort, 
and to minimise the negative impact that armed conflict has on students’ 
safety and education.”79  
Guideline 1 [Injunction against Use of Functioning Schools]: This 
guideline states that functioning schools and universities should not be used 
by parties to armed conflict in any way that supports the military initiative, 
even when the school or university is temporarily closed, at times outside of 
school hours, or on weekend, holidays, and vacation periods.80  
Guideline 2 [Efforts to Avoid Using Abandoned or Evacuated Schools]: 
This guideline states that schools or universities that have been abandoned or 
evacuated should not be used for military purposes unless there is no viable 
                                                                                                                   
 73 COMMENTARY ON THE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 7. 
 74 Safe Schools Declaration Endorsements, GCPEA, http://protectingeducation.org/guideli 
nes/support.  
 75 GCPEA, GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTING SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES FROM MILITARY USE 
DURING ARMED CONFLICT (2014) [hereinafter THE GUIDELINES], http://protectingeducation. 
org/sites/default/files/documents/guidelines_en.pdf. 
 76 Id.  
 77 COMMENTARY ON THE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 4–5. 
 78 Id. at 4. 
 79 Id.  
 80 THE GUIDELINES, supra note 75. 
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alternative to obtaining a similar military advantage.81  Even if the alternative 
building is not as conveniently placed or configured, the guideline contends 
that the alternative site should be regarded as a better option.82  These 
schools should only be occupied for the minimum necessary time, and 
should always be available for re-opening as an educational institution as 
soon as practical.83  Furthermore, any damage to the school or university 
should be repaired as soon as possible, and all remnants of war should be 
removed from the site.84  
Guideline 3 [Injunction against Destroying Schools to Deprive Use]: This 
guideline explains that schools and universities are “civilian objects,” and as 
such they “must never be destroyed as a measure intended to deprive the 
opposing parties to the armed conflict of the ability to use them in the 
future.”85  
Guideline 4 [Efforts to Avoid Attacking Schools]: This guideline explains 
that using schools and universities for military purposes may subject those 
institutions to attack.86  The guideline continues that parties should consider 
“all feasible alternative measures before attacking [schools], including, 
unless circumstances do not permit, warning the enemy in advance that an 
attack will be forthcoming unless it ceases its use.”87  This guideline further 
recommends that parties to armed conflict take into consideration the special 
protection afforded to children and the negative effect an attack could have 
on the community’s access to education if the school were to be damaged or 
destroyed.88  It states that the use of a school or university “in support of the 
military effort should not serve as justification for an opposing party that 
captures it to continue to use it in support of the military effort,” and that as 
soon as possible the educational facility should be vacated and returned to its 
educational function.89  
Guideline 5 [Efforts to Avoid Employing Parties to Armed Forces as 
School Security]: This guideline advises that parties to armed conflict should 
not be employed to provide security for schools and universities unless 
                                                                                                                   
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. The guideline states that buildings otherwise protected under International 
Humanitarian Law, such as hospitals, are not to be regarded as better options.  
 83 Id.  
 84 Id.  
 85 Id. 
 86 Id.  
 87 Id.  
 88 Id.  
 89 Id.  
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alternative means are not available, and that, if possible, civilian personnel 
should be in these positions.90  The guideline continues that if such fighting 
forces engage in security tasks at schools and universities, they should stay 
away from the school grounds and buildings to the extent possible in order to 
protect its civilian status and learning environment.91 
Guideline 6 [Requirement to Incorporate the Guidelines]: This guideline 
states that all parties to armed conflict should, to the extent possible and 
appropriate and through the most appropriate method, incorporate the 
Guidelines into their doctrine, military manuals, rules of engagement, 
operational orders, and other means of dissemination, to encourage 
appropriate practice throughout the chain of command.92  
The Commentary on the Guidelines also provides the applicable 
international legal framework, examples of domestic law, guidance, practice, 
and notes and references.93  The section titled “Analysis of the International 
Legal Framework Relating to Military Use of Schools during Armed 
Conflict” provides the legal framework “applicable to the targeting of 
schools and universities,” focusing on International Humanitarian Law.94  
This section also provides information on International Human Rights Law, a 
list of quotes from relevant international treaty provisions, and relevant 
international guidance.95  The next section, titled “Examples of Relevant 
Domestic Law, Guidance, and Practice” provides evidence of good practice 
already applied by some states and non-state parties to protect schools and 
universities during armed conflict.96  It begins with legislation from various 
countries protecting educational institutions, typically requiring written 
authorization for use of schools during armed conflict.97  It continues to 
include peacekeeping doctrinal guidance, relevant guidance in military 
manuals and doctrine, jurisprudence, governmental guidance, and practice of 
non-state parties to armed conflict.98  The Commentary on the Guidelines 
concludes with a list of notes and references.99  
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3.  Intended Impact of the Guidelines Take Effect 
According to the Coalition, the Guidelines were created “to provide 
concrete guidance to states and non-state armed groups on how to reduce the 
use of schools and universities by armed parties and to minimize the negative 
impact that armed conflict has on students’ safety and education.”100  In 
December 2014, Sheppard wrote that the Guidelines are “intended to respond 
to the practice of government forces and non-state armed groups converting 
schools and universities into bases or barracks, or using them as firing 
positions or places to cache weapons and ammunition.”  Specifically, the 
document is intended to guide individuals involved in planning and 
implementing military operations as they consider whether to use schools 
and universities.101  The Guidelines are similarly meant to help 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations monitor activity 
related to the conduct of armed conflict and the military use of schools.102 
The Guidelines provide suggested actions that each government should 
implement to end the military use of schools.103  The Guidelines are not 
meant to change international law and are not legally binding in 
themselves.104  Rather, they are intended to “lead to a shift in behavior that 
will lead to better protections for schools and universities in times of armed 
conflict . . . .”105  The Guidelines acknowledge that parties to armed conflict 
face difficult dilemmas that require pragmatic solutions; aiming to achieve 
what is practical, they suggest that states adopt the Guidelines “in the spirit 
in which they are promulgated, and to adapt them in practice to suit their 
specific circumstances.”106  The Guidelines are intended for wide 
dissemination and implementation, and have therefore been crafted for use 
by all parties to armed conflict.107 
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III.  THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  Binding International Law Governing Education and Armed Conflict 
1.  International Education-Rights Law 
International law guarantees the child’s right to an education.108  Adopted 
in 1948, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, proclaimed in Article 
26 that “[e]veryone has the right to education.”109  The right to education has 
since been widely recognized internationally, and has been further elaborated 
upon within the Children’s Convention.110  Moreover, the right to education 
has also been adopted into regional treaties, and is protected by many 
national constitutions.111  
The Children’s Convention explicitly recognizes education as a legal 
right.112  Article 28 states: 
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, 
and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the 
basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular: 
 (a)  Make primary education compulsory and available free 
to all; 
 (b) Encourage the development of different forms of 
secondary education . . . [and] make them available and 
accessible to every child . . .; 
 (c)  Make higher education accessible to all . . .; 
 (e)  Take measures to encourage regular attendance at 
schools and the reduction of drop-out rates.113 
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2.  International Humanitarian Law 
International humanitarian law, also called the law of armed conflict, 
restricts the means and methods of warfare to protect people who are not 
participating in hostilities.114  In Article 52, Additional Protocol I states: 
1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of 
reprisals.  Civilian objects are all objects which are not military 
objectives as defined in paragraph 2. 
2.  Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives.  In so 
far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to 
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use 
make an effective contribution to military action and whose 
total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage. 
3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally 
dedicated to civilian purposes, such as . . . a school, is being 
used to make an effective contribution to military action, it 
shall be presumed not to be so used.115 
The Guidelines acknowledge that “educational facilities are ordinarily 
civilian objects,” and, as such, are “not to be targeted unless they are turned 
into military objectives.”116  The military may therefore transform these 
learning institutions into legitimate military objectives under international 
law by using them as an “effective contribution to military action.”117  
The intentional attack of an educational building is also listed as a war 
crime punishable by Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court.118  However, the statute makes an exception for schools that 
have become military objectives:  
2.  For the purpose of this Statute, “war crimes” means:  
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(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings 
dedicated to . . . education . . . provided they are not 
military objectives.119  
As the Guidelines point out, “[t]he right to education means little if 
students cannot safely attend school or university.”120  
B. Gap in the Law: Neither Education-Rights nor Humanitarian Law 
Treaties Expressly Ban All Military Use of Schools 
Traditional sources of international law include international conventions, 
or treaties, establishing expressly recognized rules by states, international 
custom evidenced by general practice accepted as law, general principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations, and judicial decisions and scholarly 
teachings.121  As stated above, some treaties establish the child’s right to an 
education and protect educational facilities from attack; some of these 
guarantees also qualify as customary international law.122  While deliberate 
attacks on schools are prohibited, passive military uses of these facilities 
often transform them into military objectives.123  Consequently, once a 
school becomes a military objective it becomes exposed to attack.124  There 
is no written law, nor any clear custom, protecting schools from military use 
during armed conflict, creating a gap in the law that has put schools, 
students, and teachers in danger.  By guiding individuals involved in the 
planning of military operations to avoid the use of school buildings, the 
Guidelines intend to reduce the use of schools and universities by armed 
parties and close this dangerous gap in the law.125 
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IV.  EVALUATION OF THE DEGREE THAT THE GUIDELINES MIGHT HELP END 
THE MILITARY USE OF SCHOOLS 
A.  The Guidelines as Soft Law 
The devastating effects in Syria from the military use of schools and 
universities during armed conflict demonstrate a gap between the laws that 
protect the child’s right to an education and those that protect educational 
facilities from attack.126  This gap allows the military, under international 
law, to transform learning institutions into legitimate targets for attack by 
turning those facilities into military objectives.127   
One potential solution to this gap would be to establish and implement a 
multilateral treaty regulating the military use of schools during armed 
conflict.  Treaties are often a preferred form of law for a variety of 
reasons.128  First, treaties have identifiable content,129 and plainly provide the 
terms of international legal rules.130  In addition, treaties also reflect the 
formal consent of states to be bound by the instrument’s terms,131 and thus 
establish legal rights and duties that carry an expectation of obedience 
between sovereign states.132  
Nevertheless, the legal status, clarity, and pressure of compliance 
associated with treaties are combatted by disadvantages of using these 
instruments within the arena of international law.133  For example, treaties 
often require cumbersome procedures of approval and ratification,134 which 
necessarily entail formal negotiation and express consent; processes that 
could be circumvented through alternative forms of international law.135  
Moreover, treaties are also limited instruments in that they may fail to meet 
the needs of a changing situation, and are only binding on those states that 
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ratify and consent to their encompassed terms.136  Lastly, treaties can be 
more difficult to amend than other forms of international law.137  
Given these drawbacks, and in the absence of the traditional international 
law sources, states have resorted to nontraditional forms of lawmaking to 
regulate international activity.138  Often called “soft law,” these forms can be 
an attractive alternative when the traditional forms of international law 
recognized in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, such as treaties 
and custom, are insufficient to regulate the issue at hand.139  Soft law’s 
advantages over hard law include the fact that soft law instruments are not 
confined to those states who consent to ratification, and as a result may also 
be used to induce participation from non-consenting states.140  Moreover, soft 
law can be adopted more rapidly because it does not require the formal 
procedures of approval necessary to establish binding hard law.141   
Soft law, however, also has disadvantages when compared to its hard law 
counterparts.  Soft law instruments are not legally binding.142  Moreover, 
since soft law is not binding, it is controversial with respect to the legal force 
it is afforded.143  Soft law alternatives are also frequently created by non-state 
actors, such as nongovernment agencies.  Such doubtful law-making 
authority can render soft law instruments variable and elusive.144  
The Guidelines were created as a soft law instrument to govern the 
military use of schools during armed conflict.145  As mentioned above, the 
Guidelines are primarily the work of nongovernmental organizations, who 
then prodded U.N. officials and representatives of states to join.146  Since soft 
law approaches, like the Guidelines, offer both advantages and disadvantages 
when compared to hard law approaches,147 it is important to assess whether 
the underlying goals of the Guidelines are furthered by soft law advantages 
sufficient to overcome the disadvantages of not choosing a hard-law 
alternative.  
                                                                                                                   
 136 Id.  
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 73. 
 139 Id. at 93. 
 140 Id.  
 141 Id. 
 142 Id.  
 143 Id. at 94. 
 144 Id.  
 145 COMMENTARY TO THE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 4. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id.  
2016] MILITARY USE OF EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES  359 
 
 
It is gravely evident by the situation in Syria that the military use of 
schools during armed conflict is a problem that calls for timely response.148  
If remedy of this situation were sought in the form of a treaty, burdensome 
procedures in search of approval could take a substantial amount of time.  
This would allow the military use of schools to continue.  Consequently, 
students would continue to have their education disrupted and their lives 
endangered by these circumstances,149 while lawmakers take steps to create 
binding law.150  Soft law is generally adopted much more rapidly because it 
does not entail the procedures that render hard law binding.151  Therefore, the 
Guidelines will better serve the timely needs of the military use of schools 
during armed conflict than a treaty would.  
In addition, an issue that often arises from attempting to regulate 
international activity is the willingness of countries to become amenable to 
the regulation.  Since treaties require the affirmative consent from each state 
party,152 states may be less likely to join a treaty out of fear of repercussion 
stemming from a failure to adhere to the express terms of a particular 
instrument.153  It is therefore persuasive that the Guidelines, as soft law, will 
meet the desire of “wide dissemination”154 and greater participation by states 
and non-state actors better than a hard law alternative.  
Another consideration is the textual confinement of a treaty.  Treaties are 
difficult to amend, and can fail to meet the changing needs of the situation.155  
It could be detrimental to criminalize the military use of schools during 
armed conflict because the needs of war change.  In some narrow 
circumstances, the greater good may be satisfied by the military use of 
schools.  In this way, the flexible nature and fluidity of the Guidelines 
renders it more conducive to the ever-changing needs of situations impacted 
by armed conflict.   
Another particular concern with soft law instruments is that they are, by 
definition, not law.156  Such instruments therefore lose the pressures for 
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compliance associated with treaties.157  This brings up grave concerns of 
enforceability.  However, wide implementation of the Guidelines may, over 
time, become customary international law, and thus imply state consent 
through state practice.158  It is settled that by “the general assent of civilized 
nations,” that a practice may become “of universal obligation.”159  This 
enforceability, however, requires a ripening over time.160  Nevertheless, it is 
evident that a soft law approach in the form of the Guidelines best satisfies 
the remedial needs of the military use of schools during armed conflict, 
regardless of their lack of enforceability, because they do not preclude a 
more binding alternative from forming. 
After consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of using the 
Guidelines to remedy the military use of schools during armed conflict, as 
opposed to a hard law approach, it is evident that the need for a rapidly 
adaptable, changeable, and more inclusive form of lawmaking prevails over 
the accountability benefits that a hard law approach could provide.  It is now 
pertinent to conclude whether this soft law approach satisfies the 
recommendations and goals set forth by the Coalition to end the military use 
of schools during armed conflict.   
B.  Evaluating This Soft-Law Option against Key Criteria 
The Coalition, before the release of the finalized Guidelines in December 
2014, set out a list of proposed criteria for the Guidelines in the form of 
recommended solutions and goals.161  The proposed criteria included: 
recognition that the military use of schools during armed conflict is a 
common practice in need of a remedy; adherence to international law, 
including international humanitarian law and international human rights law; 
promoting implementation of the Guidelines’ ban; the monitoring and 
reporting of activity; and encouraging the mitigation of harm.162  In 
addressing whether, and to what effect, the Guidelines will remedy the 
military use of schools during armed conflict, it is first pertinent to determine 
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whether the Guidelines further the recommendations and goals issued by the 
Coalition.  
1. Raising Awareness of the Scope and Gravity of the Problem 
The Coalition suggested that recognition of the negative impact caused by 
military use of schools during armed conflict would aid in stop the 
practice.163  Specifically, governments, non-state armed groups, and other 
actors “should acknowledge that military use of schools and other education 
institutions is a common practice in armed conflict that requires a concerted 
response at both the national and international level.”164 
This recommendation is first addressed in the introduction to the 
Guidelines.165  The introduction promotes awareness of the gravity of the 
problem by explaining how and why the military uses schools during armed 
conflict and the resulting dangers and disruption to children’s education.166  
The introduction also provides a means to increase exposure by stating that 
the Guidelines are meant for wide dissemination and implementation167 and 
asserting that greater access to the Guidelines would increase awareness.  
Further, the sixth guideline calls for incorporation of the Guidelines into 
military documents to increase dissemination throughout the chain of 
command and raise awareness for those best situated to implement the 
Guidelines.168  
What the introduction does not do, however, is sufficiently emphasize the 
gravity of the situation.  Data and statistics, such as the number of schools 
that have been used and the number of students consequently denied access 
to their education, could help emphasize the extent of the problem and its 
need for address.  Data of this nature inevitably change as time passes; 
nevertheless, physical numbers may be more effective in helping readers to 
recognize the impact that military use of schools has had.  Perhaps it would 
also be more persuasive to use concrete examples of instances, such as in 
Syria, in which the gravity of the effects of the use of schools has manifested 
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in a clear way.169  On the other hand, the Guidelines may be disserved by 
singling out a specific country or countries.  
In sum, the Coalition desires acknowledgment that military use of schools 
is a common practice in need of an international response, but does not 
adequately demonstrate that this practice is common.  While the introduction 
does clearly state how the military use of schools impacts education, it does 
not express the extent to which schools are being impacted and the 
devastating number of students who have experienced disruption in their 
education.170 Information of this nature may help both to increase the 
knowledge and understanding of the degree to which the military use of 
schools affects education, and to induce implementation of the Guidelines. 
2.  Advancing Adherence to Applicable Binding Law  
Another solution recommended by the Coalition is to promote adherence 
to current international law, including international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law.171  The Coalition describes adherence to 
these laws as taking “all feasible precautions to protect the civilian 
population and civilian objects, including schools and universities, against 
the effects of attacks.”172  The Coalition continues that, at a minimum, 
adherence “means prohibiting the military use of schools and universities 
while they continue to be used as education institutions.”173 
Applicable binding international laws are recognized in the introduction 
to the Guidelines and also described in great detail in the Commentary on the 
Guidelines.174  The Commentary on the Guidelines also provide relevant 
treaty provisions and international guidance, such as resolutions from the 
Security Council.175  The Guidelines sufficiently explain these laws and the 
rights they afford.  Further, the Guidelines provide statements from states 
that have vowed to adhere to international law and prohibit the military use 
of schools.  The President of the Syrian Opposition Coalition and Chief of 
Staff of Supreme Military Council in the Free Syrian Army signed a 
Declaration in April 2013 that states: “[O]ccupation [of schools] by military 
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forces represents a direct violation of domestic and international 
law. . . . [T]he Free Syrian Army today states its official position prohibiting 
the militarization of schools . . . .”176  It appears that the Guidelines satisfy 
the recommendation to advance adherence to applicable binding law. 
3.  Promoting Implementation of the Guidelines’ Ban 
The Coalition stated that the Guidelines should assist servicemen “in their 
decision-making during battlefield situations and military operations.”177  
The Guidelines also assist commanders and military planners to prepare 
ahead and lessen the need to use schools and universities.178  Specifically, the 
recommendation suggests that parties to armed forces “amend their military 
manuals, train their personnel, and issue military orders in line with good 
practice, including prohibiting armed forces from using schools and 
universities.”179 
Guideline 6 specifically calls for the implementation of the Guidelines 
into “doctrine, military manuals, rules of engagement, operational orders, 
and other means of dissemination, to encourage appropriate practice 
throughout the chain of command.”180  The Guidelines suggest prohibiting 
the use of schools by armed forces and includes examples of good 
practices.181  The Guidelines thus give specific instructions on how the 
Guidelines’ ban of the military use of schools is to be implemented into 
military protocol.  The President of Syrian Opposition Coalition of the Free 
Syrian Army pledged to comply with this recommended implementation in a 
signed Declaration.182  The Declaration stated that the statement prohibiting 
the military use of schools “will be circulated among all of our battalions and 
guide the actions of our members.”183  As made clear by the language of the 
Guidelines and the resulting Declaration by Syria, the Guidelines adequately 
fulfill the recommendation of strengthening legal standards by promoting the 
implementation of the Guidelines’ ban.  
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4.  Monitoring Compliance  
Another of the Coalition’s recommendations is to “give greater attention 
to monitoring and reporting on military use of schools and education 
institutions . . . whenever it occurs.”184  This recommendation is especially 
important, because without knowledge that the Guidelines’ ban on the 
military use of schools has been violated, it is impossible to take measures to 
remedy that violation.  
The introduction to the Guidelines merely suggests that the Guidelines are 
used “as a tool for inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations 
engaged in monitoring, programming, and advocacy related to the conduct of 
armed conflict.”185  The Guidelines themselves do not give any guidance on 
how local organizations, states, and agencies should monitor and report 
violations of the Guidelines.  Similarly, the Declaration in Syria states that 
“[a]ny individuals found to violate the principles listed in our proclamation 
will be held accountable . . . .”186  However, violators will only be held 
accountable if their violations are discovered.  The Guidelines merely 
suggest that governments “credibly and impartially investigate and 
prosecute” violators.187  Suggestions on a specific monitoring structure may 
have been helpful in assuring proper enforcement of the Guidelines.  Instead, 
the Guidelines left it up to each state to create a monitoring system.  
5.  Encouraging Mitigation of Harm  
The Coalition stated that the Guidelines will assist “[g]overnments and 
international and domestic organizations in . . . mitigating the harmful 
consequences when parties to a conflict do use schools.”188  The Guidelines 
require parties to armed conduct to completely remove traces of their use of 
the school and make every effort to remedy any damage caused to school 
buildings.  Unfortunately, the Guidelines’ remedial measures only focus on 
fixing the building, and show no concern for the students who have been 
deprived of their education for years.  
Just as the Guidelines require that the military remedy any damage done 
to school buildings, the Guidelines should also require that the government 
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take steps to provide the educational opportunities that have been forfeited 
by students.  As demonstrated by both the Guidelines189 and the Children’s 
Convention,190 education is an invaluable tool in maintaining and furthering 
society.  Preserving the right to education is of great importance, but 
ensuring that the students who have been deprived of their education receive 
an opportunity to make up those lost years is similarly important.  
Upon requiring that governments address the years of education lost by 
students, the Guidelines should also provide suggestions to governments on 
how to do so.  These suggestions on how to remedy the years of education 
lost would likely serve a parallel purpose of promoting re-enrollment in 
schools.  For example, the Guidelines could suggest that a maximum age for 
grade school be extended.  Similarly, the Guidelines could suggest that 
governments create an accelerated educational program for students who 
were deprived of their education for some period of time.  The Guidelines 
could also suggest that university students be incentivized to return to their 
voluntary academic pursuits.  Regardless of what suggestions are made, it is 
pertinent that the generation gap in education resulting from the military use 
of schools during armed conflict is not ignored. 
Lastly, it is important to address whether the Coalition’s 
recommendations are, in themselves, useful to end the military use of schools 
and universities during armed conflict.  The recommendations provide a 
comprehensive approach that covers raising awareness of the problem, 
encouraging recognition of the right to education, promoting adherence to 
the laws that seek to prevent attacks on educational institutions vis-à-vis 
implementation of the Guidelines, and monitoring and punishing 
violations.191  The recommended criteria adequately flesh out the elements 
necessary for an effective and comprehensive approach to ending the 
military use of schools during armed conflict.  However, it appears that the 
Guidelines may fall short of fully satisfying these recommendations.  In 
particular, the Guidelines fall short of satisfying the recommendation that 
they provide specific guidance on monitoring for violations and holding 
violators accountable. 
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C.  Additional Measures to Improve This Soft-Law Regime 
This Note has addressed potential shortcomings of the Guidelines by 
comparing the Guidelines with the recommendations for remedying the 
military use of schools during armed conflict issued by the Coalition.192  
The Guidelines fall short of the Coalition’s recommendations in two very 
important ways.  First, the Guidelines do not adequately emphasize the 
gravity of the consequences that occur as a result of the military use of 
schools during armed conflict.  Servicemen may be more likely to avoid 
using schools if they fully understand the devastating effects such a decision 
could have on children’s safety and access to education.  In response to this 
potential shortcoming, this Note suggests that the Guidelines stress, in 
greater detail, the gravity of the effects resulting from the military use of 
schools during armed conflict.  
Second, the Guidelines should take strides to provide adequate 
information on how to monitor and report activity that violates the 
Guidelines or ways to investigate and prosecute these violations.  The ability 
to monitor and report violations is crucial to determining who to hold 
accountable for these violations, and the ability to prosecute these violators is 
crucial to ensuring that the Guidelines are enforced.  Therefore, the 
Guidelines need to address these issues directly, rather than in passing, to 
help a country such as Syria to effectively and efficiently put an end to the 
military use of schools during armed conflict.  As one potential solution to 
this shortcoming, the Guidelines could suggest that an oversight committee 
be established within the chain of command to be responsible for identifying 
violations of the Guidelines.  
Lastly, and potentially most importantly, is the Guidelines’ failure to 
suggest that governments should, or how governments could, remedy the 
years of education that have been forfeited as a result of the military use of 
schools during armed conflict.  Without action, an entire generation will fall 
victim to an educational gap, even after the military use of schools has 
ceased.  A reparations structure should be developed to provide an education 
to the children who have been deprived one.  
The Guidelines could also recommend that each state create provisions 
for criminal prosecution for violations of the Guidelines.  National provisions 
of this kind would deter violations and increase adherence to the Guidelines.  
                                                                                                                   
 192 Id. 
2016] MILITARY USE OF EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES  367 
 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As a result of conflict around the world, armed forces are using schools 
and universities to further military objectives, thereby disrupting students’ 
education and turning schools into legitimate military targets.193  The 
Guidelines were created to stop the military use of schools during armed 
conflict.194  This Note evaluated the effectiveness of the Guidelines by first 
determining that the Guidelines met most of the Coalition’s recommended 
solutions and calls for action.  It also determined that authoritative soft law, 
such as the Guidelines, is a better remedy for this problem than a hard law 
alternative.  
Although the effects of the military use of schools in Syria have been 
devastating, the Guidelines have inspired the Syrian military to take 
preventative strides by prohibiting such actions and seeking to end the 
military use of schools.  These strides could save the lives of children, lessen 
their exposure to sexual violence, forced labor, and injury, and restore their 
ability to pursue an education.  There are, however, a few ways in which the 
Guidelines could further these initiatives.  This Note suggests that one such 
way to improve the effectiveness of the Guidelines is for the Guidelines to 
emphasize the gravity of the consequences that result from the military use 
of schools during armed conflict.  This could motivate servicemen to give 
greater deference to the Guidelines.  Next, the Guidelines should provide 
suggestions on how to monitor and report violations of the Guidelines to 
increase accountability.  The Guidelines should also require governments to 
take measures to remedy the years of education lost and suggest a reparation 
structure for governments to implement.  These suggestions could further the 
effectiveness of the Guidelines in putting an end to the military use of 
schools in Syria and remedying the damage it causes.  
Finally, this Note urges governments to adopt the Guidelines and join the 
initiative to end the military use of schools during armed conflict, and allow 
children to attend school without fear. 
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